Classical computation is essentially local in time, yet some formulations of physics are global in time. Here, I examine these differences and suggest that certain forms of unconventional computation are needed to model physical processes and complex systems. These include certain forms of analogue computing, massively parallel field computing and self-modifying computations.
Introduction
argues that the universe is a giant quantum computer, computing itself. He arrives at this conclusion by focussing on information processing by physical reality. Wharton (2012) argues against this view. His argument takes a different form, and is based on the way certain laws of quantum physics are formulated, and the relationship of this formulation to computation.
Without addressing the argument of whether the universe is or is not a computer (or whether that question even makes sense), here I use Wharton's argument as a starting point for examining certain aspects of various unconventional computational systems.
First, I provide the background of Wharton's argument, as it relates to models of computation, in Section 2. Then, I discuss whether this computational conclusion is valid in the case of conventional (Section 3) and unconventional (Section 4) computational models. I then discuss the role of time in unconventional computations, in Section 5. Finally, I discuss the implications for computational systems in Section 6.
Wharton's argument: Newtonian versus Lagrangian mechanics
Here, I briefly summarize Wharton (2012) 's argument, focusing on the computational aspects. (The full argument is more to do with models and interpretations of quantum mechanics.) The argument centres around the merits of Newtonian versus Lagrangian mechanics as models of physics. Both these are formulations of Newton's "System of the World" (Newton 1728), of differential equation-based laws of motion.
The differential formulation
The first of these formulations uses laws that "specify the rules for how the point that describes the initial conditions in configuration space evolves in time" (Smolin 2009 ). Wharton follows Smolin in calling this "the Newtonian schema". This Newtonian schema formulation 1 commonly defines the time evolution of the system in question in terms of one or more first-order ordinary differential equations (ODEs). This differential formulation is "local" in time, an "instantaneous" formulation: given a state at a particular time t, the equations define the state at the next infinitesimal instant t + dt.
Given such a formulation, a natural way to calculate the system path is to follow the time evolution directly: integrate the equations forward in time from the initial conditions (such as the position and velocity at time t = 0), in order to determine the final conditions (such as position and velocity as time t = T ). The previous sentence is cast in mathematical terminology; it can equally well be cast in computational terminology as: iteratively compute from the inputs, to determine the outputs.
The integral formulation
Lagrangian mechanics is an alternative formulation. Its key property for Wharton's argument is its basis on constraints, specifically "the principle of least action" 2 , rather than explicitly Newton's laws of motion (which can be derived from the principle). The action S of a system is the integral of the Lagrangian L over the path the system takes over time: S = T 0 L dt. The action is defined for any potential path. On the path the system actually takes, the action is stationary: δS = 0. This integral formulation is "global" in time: it is a property of the entire path, relative to nearby paths.
In this formulation, it is straightforward to put constraints on the system at different times (for example, initial position at t = 0 and final position at t = T ), and then determine the other parameters of the system (for example, initial velocity at t = 0). Computationally, the inputs are the boundary conditions, which are not necessarily initial conditions. Given such a formulation there is no similar natural way to calculate the system path. We need the entire path in order to calculate the action, and we need a set of paths in order to find the one with minimum (or stationary) action.
Equivalent laws?
These local and global formulations are alternative ways of expressing the same laws of motion. In principle, one formulation can be recast in terms of the other. However, there is more to solving a set of equations than the equations themselves: in each specific case, we also require the specific boundary conditions. In the Newtonian schema, these are initial conditions. In the least action formulation, however, these conditions can be imposed at different times, and the given initial conditions, considered alone, may thereby under-constrain the problem, leaving them insufficient for a Newtonian schema style solution.
Initial conditions may not be the appropriate formulation
Wharton's argument is that much of the present day problems with quantum mechanics are that it is modelled in Newtonian schema terms, requiring a complete knowledge of initial conditions, from which the final conditions are then deduced. He claims that quantum systems are more naturally modelled in terms of the alternative constraint-formulation style, where the input knowledge of the system can be spread across different times. 
Computational formulation
The part of Wharton's argument of interest in this paper is his identification of computation with a Newtonian schema style of calculation: computation comprises iterating a calculation from the initial state and inputs to the final state and outputs ( Figure 1(a) ). This computational model struggles to simulate systems defined in terms of the constraint of least action: multiple potential paths have to be calculated, and the minimum action one sought (Figure 1(b) ). Wharton then concludes that, since the (quantum) universe is at heart most naturally described in a least action formulation, whereas computation is essentially embedded in the Newtonian schema, that the universe is not a computer. The universe does not determine its least action computationally. (He does not say how it does determine it.)
If computation is essentially Newtonian, this is a more immediate issue than philosophical arguments about whether or not the universe is not a computer. There are many least action-like problems that we would like to be able to compute efficiently. For example, consider the optical fourier transform (Goodman 2005, Figure 5 .7), where the light from an image placed in the focal plane of a convex lens is passed through the lens, and the image's fourier transform appears on a screen placed in the other focal plane. While the fast fourier transform algorithm (Cooley and Tukey 1965) calculates the discrete fourier transform of N points in time O(N log N ) operations, the optical fourier transform (apparently) calculates it in time O(1).
Terminology
In the following discussion, I will for brevity use Newtonian and Lagrangian to refer to physics and/or computation expressed in the local differential Newtonian schema, and expressed in the global integral Lagrangian least action formulation, respectively.
Is computation essentially Newtonian?
Here, I discuss Wharton's claim that computation is essentially Newtonian, and the light that investigation of this claim can shed on conventional and unconventional computation.
Imperative languages are Newtonian
The programming languages typically used for solving scientific problems are those such as Fortran, C, C++ and Matlab. These belong to the class of imperative languages, that are "based on commands that update variables held in storage" (Watt 2004, ch. 11) . A program defines a specific sequence of commands that incrementally change this stored state from the initial state to the final state, and "an imperative …program may be viewed abstractly as implementing a mapping from inputs to outputs" (Watt 2004, ch. 15) .
When solving a physical problem cast in the Newtonian schema formulation, this sequence of commands and the associated state changes are direct analogues of the progression of physical time and its associated physical state changes in the problem (Figure 1(a) ). Watt (2004, ch. 11) comments on the naturalness of this paradigm:
Many programs are written to model real-world processes affecting real-world entities, and a realworld entity often possesses a state that varies with time. So, real-world entities can be modelled naturally by variables, and real-world processes by commands that inspect and update these variables.
Specifically, consider a set of equations of motion specified as first-order differential equations in normal form 3 as
where i = 1 . . . n, and with initial conditions given for the x i at time t = 0. We can straightforwardly compute 4 the values of the x i at time t = T in an imperative language:
Logic languages are more Lagrangian than Newtonian
When computing the solution of a physical problem cast in the least action formulation, however, there is a "disconnect between algorithmic time and actual time" (Wharton 2012) , and a similar disconnect between program state iterating through multiple potential physical paths, and the single actual physical state of least action (Figure 1(b) ).
Not all programming languages are imperative, however. Another class is that of logic languages, such as Prolog. Watt (2004, ch. 15) describes the different flavour of the logic paradigm:
A logic program …implements a relation. Since relations are more general than mappings, logic programming is potentially higher-level than imperative …programming.
In such a language, the program is a set of statements, and the result is the consequence that can be inferred from the statements.
For example, we can define a set of rules such as 5 :
From this, we can infer that has_legs(archy, 6).
In order to define a least action-style calculation, we could include a rule like:
is_least_action(Path).
On the face of it then, logic programming languages would seem to be Lagrangian. However, in conventional computation, that is not actually the case.
Denotational versus operational semantics
What I have been talking about so far is different high-level programming paradigms: imperative versus logic languages.
Whatever paradigm is used, a program has a meaning, such as a mapping from input to output, or a relation between sets of entities. That meaning can be defined in higher-or lower-level ways. See, for example, (Schmidt 1986, 3) , (Meyer 1990, ch. 4) .
The high level, mathematical meaning of the programs, is defined, for example, in a denotational or axiomatic form. Denotational semantics can be used to define the meaning of an imperative programming language as the mathematical function that maps its input to its output. Axiomatic semantics can be used to define the meaning of a logic programming language in terms of axioms and inference rules, which are used to infer the meaning of a program text.
But when one comes to calculate an output from an input, or to infer the consequences of the program statements, or in other words, to compute the meaning, an operational semantics is needed. In this case, the meaning of the language is defined in terms of the actions of a (abstract) machine interpreting the language statements: it defines an algorithm that computes the meaning. In other words, "In an operational semantics we are concerned with how to execute programs and not merely with what the results of the execution are." (Nielson and Nielson 1992, ch. 2) Fisher and Henzinger (2007) describe the difference as:
A computational model is a formal model whose primary semantics is operational; that is, the model prescribes a sequence of steps or instructions that can be executed by an abstract machine, which can be implemented on a real computer. A mathematical model is a formal model whose primary semantics is denotational; that is, the model describes by equations a relationship between quantities and how they change over time. The equations do not determine an algorithm for solving them … In conventional computation at least, operational semantics is "Newtonian": it defines the specific state changes in imperative languages, and it defines a specific algorithm to perform inferencing in logic languages. For the least action computation, the algorithm to infer the path that satisfies is_least_action(Path) will be something akin to "calculate the action of all possible Paths, and chose the one with least action".
Not all logic language programs execute this inefficiently! This is analogous to an operational semantics for is_sorted(List) being "calculate all possible permutations of List, and choose the sorted one". In the case of sorting, there are much more efficient algorithms, which can be provided by the programmer or by a clever optimizing compiler. In the case of calculating the least action, there may not be a much more efficient algorithm, however.
So, we seem to be back to an underlying computation akin to Figure 1(b) .
Can computation have a Lagrangian operational semantics?

The reason for Newtonian operational semantics
Wharton's argument seems to boil down to: the operational semantics of any computer is necessarily Newtonian. But just why is operational semantics Newtonian? If (some) physics may be better formulated as Lagrangian, and given that the execution of the computation occurs in a physical device, why could that execution not also be Lagrangian? Is the Newtonian schema a fundamental property of computation per se, or only of our current implementations? Standard processors are built to the so-called von Neumann architecture, with its "fetchexecute-store" cycle and stored program paradigm. This architecture is essentially iterative and state based, and so languages with imperative operational semantics map naturally onto it.
The Turing model of computation as implemented by the von Neumann architecture is itself essentially algorithmic, since it was originally designed to formalize the real-world procedures followed by human "computers": clerks carrying out calculations (Copeland 2008) .
Alternative operational semantics
The von Neumann architecture is not the only computational architecture, merely the predominant one. Other unconventional computational architectures exist: for example, neural networks, cellular automata (the other von Neumann architecture!), microfluidic processors, reaction-diffusion chemical computing, optical computing, quantum computing (with a range of associated architectures including the circuit model and measurement-based systems), and more.
The question raised by Wharton's argument is, can we have an (unconventional?) operational constraint-based computational semantics? Can we make our computations more physics-like? Yes. We can take those very physical processes that Wharton argues do not act computationally in the Newtonian schema sense, and use them as unconventional computational devices, through analogue computing. We simply need to find a physical process that is a suitable analogue of the computation we wish to do, and that we can configure as (part of) a computational device. To use a physical system as a computational device in this manner,it requires that the underlying physical model is sufficiently well characterized that we know what computation it is performing (Horsman et al. 2014) .
The role of time
Atemporal models
One question that arises from the Lagrangian formulation, with its constraints at times other than the initial time (the "now"), is: how does light "know" which is the shortest path that it should take? how does the system "know" to achieve the boundary conditions at other times? how does it arrange itself to achieve stationary action, a quantity that requires "knowledge" of future times?
To avoid the lingering teleological odour of such questions, some scientists have suggested atemporal models of physics. From the atemporal space-time of Einstein's relativity, to more subtle arguments (Barbour 1999) , these resolve the issue by removing time as a dynamic process from the picture.
Not all authors are in favour of eliminating time as something real. For example, when Smolin (2009) talks of "the misapplication of the Newtonian schema to the universe as a whole", he does not mean that he is against applying it to parts of the universe. Indeed, he lays out various principles for the reality of time, one of which is:
Everything that is real in a moment is a process of change leading to the next or future moments. …Things that persist must be thought of as processes leading to newly changed processes. An atom in a moment is a process leading to a different or a changed atom in the next moment.
In this view, time is real, and things really do progress through time.
If time is real, are we forced back to teleological-sounding explanations? One way of examining how light travels along the shortest path is to think of it in terms of waves, reinforcing and cancelling at different points in space. In this approach, the physical system is not a single localized particle, but a spatially extended field. Computation of its behaviour does not then need to follow only a single point in space, but the behaviour of all of space. So maybe it is not the temporality of classical computation that is the issue, but its spatial zero-dimensionality. All classical computation is pushed through the single point that is the von Neumann bottleneck.
Generalizations of these kind of ideas, of thinking of fields rather than particles, lead to such unconventional computational architectures as cellular automata, field computing (MacLennan 1999) and environment orientation Stepney 2009, 2011) .
Energy minimization
Another process we see in physical systems, akin to action minimization, is (free) energy minimization. For example: a ball rolls downhill to find its lowest potential energy; the protein-folding problem can be cast as a free energy minimization problem (Anfinsen 1973) . Here, however, the minimization is definitely a temporal process: the system moves from a high energy to a lower energy state, "seeking" the minimum energy state: the ball rolls downhill to its minimum potential energy state, the protein folds from an unfolded form. Contrast this with the atemporal view of the bent light crossing between two media: there was never some unbent beam that over time bent itself to the correct angle, minimizing its travel time.
There is no guarantee of success, either: the system may get caught in a local minimum, where its (free) energy is merely stationary, not minimal. Adding a thermal component may allow the system to "jiggle" out of a local minimum. This is the basis of the simulated annealing algorithm (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt Jr., and Vecchi 1983) , an optimization algorithm that equates some cost function to be minimized with a physical energy, and has an artificial temperature that slowly cools, by analogy to the physical annealing process.
However, even when we formulate algorithms that can follow the temporal process, such as the slow cooling in simulated annealing or the gradual folding of a protein, it still seems that we are having to do a lot of computational work for our result, where the physics just "happens" without explicit computation. For example, we have to explicitly calculate the energy analogues and their differences, and the related Boltzmann probabilities. The "protein folding problem" is so called because we cannot yet compute the relevant physical processes efficiently.
It appears that fields provide a more natural model of some of these processes, such as the electric fields around amino acids in proteins. Alternatively, the Boltzmann distribution at the heart of simulated annealing arises in physical systems as a statistical distribution of the energies a large number of particles. Physicists use similar statistical notions, such as a density matrix approach, to connect the deterministic macroscopic world of observation with the possibly non-deterministic underlying physical system. In the case of both the field approach, and the statistical distribution approach, it is the zero-dimensionality of classical computation where the problem lies.
Complex systems and growth
Complex systems are fundamentally temporal. They can depend critically on their detailed history (Bak and Paczuski 1995) , and are intrinsically irreversible. Because of this essential contingency, there may be no sensible formulation of their dynamics in terms of boundary conditions at the "end point" of their evolution. So, computations that are temporal are a natural fit to these systems. But again, since an essential quality of complex systems is that they contain a large number of agents and processes leading to emergent properties (Anderson 1972) , the zero-dimensionality of classical computation is a severe bottleneck to their computation.
One important sub-class of complex systems is one where the number of components changes and grows as the system develops, for example, the continual novelty expressed by open-ended evolution. Here, the very dimensionality of the system is changing, and mathematical models struggle to keep up with the dynamic introduction of new dimensions, and novel kinds of dimensions, in the overall state space (Stepney 2012a, Section 4) . The system's growing, changing components do not behave as a statistical ensemble. This time computation comes to our rescue (Stepney 2012b) . Coping with extra dimensions is straightforward: malloc(n) and new Obj(p) allocate new memory, increasing the dimensionality of the computational state space. Coping with novel kinds of dimensions, not anticipated at coding time, requires self-modifying code . This is yet another move away from the underlying constraints of classical computation, with its careful separation of code and data, to an unconventional formulation.
Conclusion Wharton (2012) admonishes us:
Now there's one last anthropocentric attitude that needs to go, the idea that the computations we perform are the same computations performed by the universe … I would suggest that there is another attitude that needs to go: that the only computational model is the classical, imperative, "Newtonian" one. Instead, we can look to the physical and biological worlds, see where they perform better, or just differently, from classical computation, and use that as inspiration for developing novel forms of unconventional computation.
Another anthropocentric attitude that needs to go is the idea that the computations our physical computers can perform are restricted to being the same as the calculations we can perform with pen-and-paper.
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